Rational Belief and Fundamental Epistemic Value: What's the Connection?

Abstract: 

Rational beliefs seem to have real epistemic value even in skeptical scenarios where rational belief-forming processes are unreliable. If this is true, can we explain why it is true? It is easy to see that we cannot if we buy the common assumption that all derivative value must be grounded via instrumental relations to fundamental epistemic value (“Instrumentalism”). But we should reject Instrumentalism. Instrumentalism provides a generally defective picture of derivative epistemic value. Moreover, it is widely rejected by value theorists outside of epistemology. By rejecting Instrumentalism in ways that value theorists have already explored, we can give a unified and truth-oriented explanation of the value of rationality, justification, knowledge, and more. There are important upshots for epistemology. Many think reliabilists have a unique ability to explain why justified belief matters, owing to the instrumental link reliabilists forge with true belief. But it is actually harder for reliabilists to explain the value of justified belief if they accept Instrumentalism. And once we see that truth-connectedness need not be understood instrumentally, we can also show that internalists could preserve a truth-oriented picture of epistemic value.

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